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1. Introduction 
 
While economics has long focused on how individual decisions are 
interconnected via markets, there has for the last decade or so developed growing interest 
in understanding how social factors beyond the marketplace affect individual decisions 
and outcomes. Economic analysis now incorporates a range of dimensions in which 
individuals interact directly with one another, rather than indirectly via the effects of 
individuals on market prices.  As noted by Manski (2000), the emergence of the social 
interactions literature parallels the rise of game theory, in which the key primitive 
assumptions are based on modeling how the behaviors of others affect an individual 
relative to general equilibrium theory, which focuses on the analysis of conditions under 
which markets can coordinate many individual decisions via a price system.  Such direct 
interdependences in behaviors and outcomes are known in the economics literature as 
social interactions. 
Economic research on social interactions has proceeded along theoretical as well 
as empirical lines.
3   In terms of abstract theory, the social interactions research has 
                                                 
2 Allen Wood translation, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pg. 228. 
3 Surveys of different aspects of the economic approach to social interactions include 
Becker and Murphy (2000), Brock and Durlauf (2001b), Durlauf (2004) and Manski 
(2000).  See also Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley (2004) for a sociological 
perspective. 
  1followed two main directions.  A first direction is the description of how interdependent 
decisions produce different aggregate configurations.  Early examples of this work 
include Blume (1993,1995), Brock (1993), and Durlauf (1993); more recent research 
includes Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b,2004,2005), Bisin, Horst, and Ozgur (2004) and 
Horst and Scheinkman (2004).  This sort of research investigates the appropriate 
specification of individual decisionmaking in the presence of social influences and the 
consequent implications of these influences for the behavior of population aggregates.  
One important message from this work is that the incorporation of social interactions into 
economic models is fully compatible with standard economic reasoning, in which 
individuals make purposeful decisions subject to constraints.  A second direction 
evaluates the role of social interactions in determining how groups form.  Research of 
this type includes Bénabou (1996), Durlauf (1996) and Hoff and Sen (2004). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the canonical example of endogenous group formation is residential 
neighborhoods; in fact, in economics, social interaction effects and neighborhood effects 
are used interchangeably.
4  These general structures have been used to develop 
theoretical descriptions of phenomena ranging from spatial unemployment patterns 
(Oomes (2003)) to welfare dependence ((Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999)) to 
economic development and the transition from underdeveloped to modern economies 
(Kelly (1997)).  These “applied theory” studies have typically been motivated by various 
empirical claims that seem hard to understand using other types of economic models.  
The sources of social interactions in various types of theoretical models are themselves 
varied.  Some models assume that there are primitive psychological reasons why 
individuals wish to conform to the behavior of others while others focus on the 
information transmission that occurs when one person observes what others choose to do. 
In parallel to this theoretical work, many empirical studies of social interactions 
now exist.  Among the conventional economic phenomena that have been studied are 
public assistance use (Aizer and Currie (2004), Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan 
(2000)), labor market behavior (Conley and Topa (2002), Topa (2001), Weinberg, 
                                                 
4Following Akerlof (1997), individuals may be conceptualized as located in a general 
social space in which groups of commonly interacting individuals constitute a 
neighborhood. 
  2Reagan, and Yankow, (2004)), agricultural contract specification (Young and Burke 
(2001)) and urban economics (Ioannides and Zabel (2003a,b), Irwin and Brockstaed 
(2002)).  In addition, interest in social interactions has led economists to study 
phenomena that are traditionally in the domain of other social sciences such as crime 
(Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996), Sirakaya (2004)), choice of medical 
techniques by physicians (Burke, Fournier, and Prasad (2004)) and smoking (Krauth 
(2003,2004), Soetevent and Kooreman (2004)). 
A third component of the new social interactions research program has been the 
systematic investigation of econometric issues.  This econometric work primarily focuses 
on the determination of conditions under which various types of social interactions may 
be econometrically identified.
5  Identification arguments in this context amount to asking 
under what conditions on data and model can the role of social interactions effects be 
distinguished from other influences on behavior.  Thus, identification analysis represents 
a key link between theory and empirics. 
The econometric research program on the identifiability of social interactions was 
initiated in Manski (1993), a seminal paper that still warrants careful study; recent 
contributions include Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b,2004,2005), Glaeser, Sacerdote, and 
Scheinkman (1996), Graham (2005), Graham and Hahn (2004), Moffitt (2001) and 
Soetevent and Kooreman (2004).  While the general econometrics of social interactions 
has not developed to the same extent as the theoretical and empirical literatures, there 
now exists a fairly wide range of results on identification. 
In this chapter, we review some of the identification results that have been 
developed in the econometrics literature on social interactions.   We will focus on two 
statistical frameworks in which social interactions have been embedded: linear models 
and binary choice models.   The discussion avoids formal proofs in order to highlight 
major conceptual issues.  The results we describe are not specific to economic contexts 
and so presumably may be useful for social epidemiologists as well.   
 
                                                 
5There is also some work on estimation and computation issues, cf. Bisin, Moro and Topa 
(2002). 
  3Section 2 describes the two statistical social interactions models which we will 
analyze. Section 3 describes the identification problems that arise when model errors are 
independent and identically distributed.  This is a useful baseline for understanding how 
identification problems arise that are intrinsic to the structure of the behavioral process.  
Section 4 discusses how self-selection of individuals into groups affects identification.  
Section 5 analyzes identification in the presence of unobserved group effects.  Section 6 
relates the econometrics literature on social interactions to some aspects of the social 
epidemiology literature.  Hierarchical models and models which incorporate social 
capital are studied.  Section 7 provides summary and conclusions. 
 
 
2. Basic models 
 
  To understand the main identification problems that arise in empirical studies of 
social interactions, we start with some notation and baseline models.  These models, 
while not exhaustive, cover much of the economic social interactions literature and 
illustrate the main identification problems faced by a researcher attempting to adduce 
evidence that social interactions matter. 
  Individuals are denoted by i and groups are denoted by g.  Each individual is a 
member of a single group; the composition of these groups is known to the researcher.  In 
other words, prior to the statistical exercise, a researcher has determined the relevant 
environment in which social interactions are present.  This is a standard assumption in 
social interactions analyses.  For example, a researcher investigating the role of 
residential neighborhoods typically makes an ex ante decision on how neighborhoods are 
measured, i.e. via census tracts, etc.  The analysis of social interactions when there is 
uncertainty about the correct specification of the relevant social groups has not been 
pursued, to our knowledge, although work such as Conley and Topa (2002) has attempted 
to compare the predictive power of different conceptions of neighborhoods defined in a 
general social space.  In principle, one can incorporate model uncertainty about the 
correct social group for individuals into the econometric analysis of social interactions, 
  4cf. Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) for one way to proceed, but the implications for 
identification have not been explored; this seems an important area for future research. 
Each individual makes a choice  i ω .   These choices are assumed to depend on a 
combination of individual-specific and group-specific factors.  The individual-specific 
factors come in two types:  i X , deterministic (to the modeler) characteristics associated 
with individual i,  and  i ε , random and unobservable (to the modeler) characteristics 
associated with i.  In the econometric analog to the theoretical model of choice under 
social interactions,  i ε  corresponds to the random error in a regression.  We assume in 
both the theoretical and econometric discussion that these random terms are independent 
and identically distributed across individuals. This means that the within-group 
distribution of  i ε  does not depend on the individual’s characteristics or the identity of the 
group of which he is a member 
 
 
, .
ii g XY FF ε ε =  (1) 
 
The assumption of i.i.d. errors will be relaxed in some directions when we discuss 
econometrics. 
Group-specific factors are partitioned into  g Y , predetermined (with respect to 
decisions by individuals concerning ω ) group-level characteristics, and  , the 
expected average choice in the group.  In the economics social interactions literature, the 
role of 
,
e
ig m
g Y  in affecting individuals is known as a contextual effect whereas the role of  
 is known as an endogenous effect and plays a central role in the discussion below.  
Contextual effects thus describe how the characteristics of others affect an individual’s 
decisions whereas endogenous effects describe how the behaviors of others affect an 
individual’s decision or choice.  The importance of this distinction is that endogenous 
effects are usually understood to be reciprocal and thus create feedbacks between 
individual decisions.  While behavioral endogeneity is rarely considered in other social 
sciences, from the economics perspective, social interactions have not been modeled at a 
,
e
ig m
deeper level than the endogenous/contextual effect distinction. An important open 
  5research question is whether attention to particular generative mechanisms, such as social 
interactions as a mechanism for information transmission, could facilitate identification.   
The use of expected average choice rather than the realized average choice is 
made f
crete, we follow discussion in Durlauf 
(2005) 
or analytical convenience.  The assumption makes most sense for larger groups 
where the behaviors of the rest of group are not directly observable.  The assumption that 
individuals react to expected rather than actual behaviors is not critical for the bulk of the 
identification analysis we describe; we will indicate where the assumption matters. See 
Graham (2005) and Soetevent and Kooreman (2004) for analysis of social interactions in 
small groups where all behaviors are observed. 
To make this abstract description con
and consider the example of modeling the determinants of schooling outcomes 
among children.  One class of explanations may focus on how parental characteristics 
affect these outcomes, as more successful parents are able to provide more educational 
resources to their children, provide role models that enhance their children’s aspirations, 
etc.  These sorts of determinants are captured by the vector  i X .  In contrast, other 
theories might focus on the role of contextual influences, such as how the sorts of 
occupations observed across adults within a residential neighborhood affect student 
aspirations or how the distribution of incomes across families within the community 
affects decisions on the level of expenditures on education. These sorts of factors are 
captured by the vector  g Y .  A final set of explanations may derive from direct 
interdependence between the educational outcomes of children; for example, high 
outcomes by one student may be induced by the desire of the student to perform as well 
as his peers.  This type of explanation is captured by  .
e
ig m . 
  How do these different factors combine to d rm ete ine individual choices?   We 
  i
consider two formal frameworks.  The first is a basic linear model with social 
interactions, originally studied in Manski (1993), in which outcomes are described by a 
linear model: 
 
,
e
ii g i g kc X d Y J m ω ε = +++ + . (2) 
 
  6Note that k and J are scalars whereas c and d are vectors
6.  This model is typically not 
udied 
in deta
derived from a fully articulated decision problem for individual agents, but this can in 
principle be done.  The model has the important virtue that it is easily interpreted as a 
regression and so may be directly taken to data, where the goal of the analysis is to 
estimate the parameters k, c, d, and J.  Claims about social interactions are, from the 
econometric perspective, equivalent to statements about the values of d  and  J .  The 
statement that social interactions matter is equivalent to the statement th  at lea t some 
element of the union of the parameters in d  and  J  is nonzero.  The statement that 
contextual social interactions are present means that at least one element of d  is nonzero.  
The statement that endogenous social interactions matter requires that J is nonzero. 
A second useful model is the binary choice model with social interactions st
at s
il by Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b).  Following Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b), 
choices are coded so that they lie in the set {1 , 1 } − .  For example,  1 −  can denote had a 
child while a teenager while 1 denotes did not have a child while a teenager, if one is 
studying teenage fertility.  This model is directly derived from an individual decision 
problem.  Each choice is associated with a payoff level  ( ) ii V ω .  The difference between 
the payoffs for the two choices is assumed to be additive in the different factors that have 
been defined, i.e. 
 
() ( ) , 11
e
ii i g i g VV k c X d Y J mi ε −− = + + + −   . (3) 
 
dividual i chooses 1 if and only if  In ( ) ( ) 11 ii VV 0 − −>, which is to say that an individual 
kes the choice tha
 
acts rationally in the sense that he ma t makes him best off.   Since  
 
() ( ) () ( )
()
,
,
Pr 1 1 0 Pr
,
e
ii i i g i g
e
ig i g
VV k c X d Y J m
Fkc X d Y J m ε
ε −− ≥= ≤ + + + =
+++
 (4) 
 
                                                 
6Throughout, coefficient vectors such as c are row vectors whereas variable vectors such 
as  i X  are column vectors. 
  7() Pr 1 , , ii g X Yg ω = , the probability that i chooses 1, is defined by 
 
  () ( ) , Pr 1 , ,
e
ii g i g i XYg Fk c X d Y J m ε ω == + + + g . (5) 
  either the linear model nor the binary choice model has any empirical content 
 
N
without restricting how individuals form expectations about the average behavior of 
others.  Otherwise, any set of observed behaviors could be reconciled with any set of 
model parameters by appropriate choices of  ,
e
ig m .  In economics, the standard approach to 
closing the social interactions model is the  irement that expectations are consistent 
with the structure of the choices in the model.  This property, known as self-consistency, 
means that the subjective expectation of the average choice in one’s group corresponds to 
the mathematical conditional expectation of the average choice, 
requ
g m , given the 
information set of each agent.  We assume these information sets includ he values of 
i
e t
X  for other agents within i’s group, the value of  g Y , as well as the equilibrium expected 
ice level that occurs for his group.  Agents are assumed to be unable to observe the 
choices of others or their random payoff terms  i
cho
ε .  Alternative information assumptions 
will not affect the qualitative properties of the mo el. For the linear in means model, self-
consistency means that    
 
d
  , 11 1
g gg e
ig g
kc X d Y kd Y c X
mm
JJ
g
J
+ ++
== = +
− −−
 (6) 
 
here w   g X  is the average of  i X  within g.  In simple terms, the mathematical expectation 
of average behavior in a group depends linearly on the average of the individual 
determinants of behavior,  g X , and the contextual effects that each member experiences 
in common,  g Y . 
For th  bi e nary choice model, self-consistency means that 
 
  8( ) , 21
e
ig g g g Xg m m F k cX dY Jm dF ε == +++ − ∫    (7) 
  
t where recall tha   Xg F  is the empirical within-group distribution of    The description 
economic theory, there is an important difference 
betwee
X .
of a process for individual choices combined with its associated self-consistency 
condition fully specifies a model.  
From the perspective of 
n the linear and binary choice models of social interactions: multiple equilibria can 
exist for the latter but not the former.  A model exhibits multiple equilibria if its 
microeconomic structure is compatible with more than one aggregate outcome.  For the 
models we have described, the only aggregate outcome of interest is the expected average 
choice level  g m .  It is evident for the linear model that once one knows the individual 
and group cha teristics within a group, there is only one expected average choice level 
that is consistent; eq. (6) maps these characteristics into a single 
rac
g m .  In contrast, eq. (7) 
can produce more than one solution for  g m .  In general, as show n Brock and Durlauf 
(2004), for each value of 
n i
g Y  and  , Xg F  f  given group, there will exist a threshold H 
(which depends on these values) su at if JH > , then there are at least three solutions 
to (7) whereas if JH
or a
ch th
< then the solution to (7 ique. ) is un
7   
More prec sults may be obtained if one specif ise re ies the functional forms for 
a , Xg F   nd Fε , these different cases are analyzed in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b,2004).  
xample, suppose that 
 
For e
() ()
1
1e x p
Fz
z
ε =
+ −
   (8) 
 
                                                 
7 The knife edge case   is conventionally ignored in theoretical studies since it is 
presumably a probability 0 possibility. 
JH =
  9  so that the model errors are negative exponentially distributed, and that 
, so that this component of the payoff differential between the two 
choices is constant across group members.  For this special case, 
ig kc X d Y h ++=
 
  () ( )
() ( )
,
,,
exp
Pr 1 , ,
exp exp
e
ig
ii g e
ig ig
hJ m
XYg
hJ m hJ m
ω
+
==
++ − −
e . (9) 
 
Under self-consistency, the expected average choice level  g m  within a group must obey 
 
  ( ) tanh g g mh J =+ m . (10) 
 
In (10),  () () ( )
() ( )
exp exp
tanh
exp exp
x x
x
x x
−−
=
+−
.  For this case, one can show formally that if 
, then the equilibria is unique whereas if  there are three equilibria, of which 
only the two extremal equilibria (in terms of the magnitude of 
JH < JH >
g m ) are stable under 
dynamic analogs of the model.  This special case is of interest since the assumption (8) 
corresponds to the logit regression model for binary choice.    
Blume and Durlauf (2003) extend this work by considering a dynamic analog of 
the binary choice model with social interactions.  This paper studies the stability of the 
self-consistent equilibria in the static model and finds that over time, a dynamic analog of 
this model will have the property that the population spends most of its time in the 
vicinity of the equilibrium that maximizes average utility, i.e. the equilibrium whose 
mean choice has the same sign as  .  One question that has not been examined is 
whether the far-from-steady state behavior of the model can provide additional 
information on social interactions that is not present in a steady state.  This is intuitively 
plausible since far-from-steady state behavior will obey a different probability process 
from steady state behavior, even though it derives from the same microeconomic 
foundations. 
h
  10The assumption that each agent reacts to the mean behavior of the population is 
restrictive. Within the economic theory literature, there has been considerable attention to 
models in which interactions are local. In such models, agents are located in some sort of 
social space and interact only with those agents that, according to some metric, are near 
the agent.    This type of work was pioneered in Föllmer (1974).  Blume (1993,1995) 
provides a rigorous analysis of models of this type, employing formal game theoretic 
arguments; Kirman (1997) is a valuable survey.  As far as we know empirical analogs of 
such models have not been formally investigated with respect to identification. 
  
 
3. Identification and the reflection problem 
 
In this section, we consider how the various determinants of individual behavior 
may be revealed empirically. We focus on a cross-section of data where individuals are 
sampled across a set of groups.  The objective of a statistical exercise is to estimate the 
parameters k, c, d, and J; identification arguments will focus on whether more than one 
set of values for these parameters generate identical probability statements about  i ω .  
When discussing binary choice models, it is understood that identification means 
identification up to scale, i.e. to say that the parameters k, c, d, and J are identified means 
that any alternative set of parameters that produces the same probability statements about 
i ω  must be a multiple of the initial parameter set.  The reason for this is that if one were 
to multiply all the parameters in (3) by a nonzero constant, individual behavior would be 
unchanged, since the choice is based on the comparison of the utility levels for each of 
the choices, not their absolute values. 
The available data to a researcher are assumed to be  i ω ,  i X  and  g Y , the individual 
choices and associated individual-specific contextual effects, as well as  Xg F  and  g Fω , 
the empirical distribution functions for the individual characteristics and individual 
outcomes within each group of which the individuals are members.  We do not consider 
whether other data can facilitate identification.  One obvious candidate is price data on 
group memberships (e.g. housing or rental prices for different neighborhoods.)  Work by 
  11Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim (2002,2004) and Nesheim (2002) suggests that such 
data may be very valuable from the perspective of hedonic pricing models  Blume and 
Durlauf (2005) consider the information content of prices in the context of structural 
estimation.  
The first problem which arises in the study of social interactions is the classic 
identification problem: under what conditions on the data, if any, can the different 
parameters in the linear model (2) and/or the binary choice model (5) be distinguished 
from an alternative set of parameters?  Intuitively, the reason why identification may not 
hold is that the distinct roles of the endogenous effects and the contextual effects may be 
difficult to disentangle because the two types of effects move together.  This comovement 
occurs because, when beliefs are self-consistent, the contextual variables  g Y  help to 
determine the endogenous variable  g m  as indicated by the self-consistency conditions (6) 
and (7).  Thus the identification problem for social interactions bears much resemblance 
to the elementary identification problem that occurs in linear regressions when the 
regressors are not linearly independent. 
  Does the fact that endogenous and contextual social interaction effects are, by the 
logic of social interaction models, correlated, lead to a failure of identification?  In the 
case of the linear regression model, the answer is yes.  Specifically, without prior 
information about the relationship between the individual-specific characteristics  i X  and 
the group-level characteristics  g Y , the linear model of social interactions is not identified.  
The possibility for nonidentification was first recognized by Manski (1993). To see why 
identification may fail for this model, assume, following Manski’s original argument, that 
g g YX = . This means that every contextual effect is the average of a corresponding 
individual characteristic.  In this case, eq. (6) reduces to 
 
  ( )
1
g
g
kc d Y
m
J
++
=
−
 (11) 
 
  12which means the regressor  g m  in (2) is linearly dependent on the other regressors, i.e. the 
constant and  g Y .   This linear dependence means that identification fails: the 
comovements of  g m  and  g Y  are such that one cannot disentangle their respective 
influences on individuals.  Manski (1993) named this failure the reflection problem; 
metaphorically, if one observes that  i ω  is correlated with the expected average behavior 
in a neighborhood, (11) indicates it may be possible that this correlation is due to the fact 
that  g m  may simply reflect the role of   g Y  in influencing individuals. 
  Are there versions of the linear model where the reflection problem does not 
hold?  The answer is yes.  To see why it is possible for some linear models with social 
interactions to be identified, suppose that we relax the assumption that  g g XY = .  In this 
case, as indicated by eq. (6), it is possible that  g m  is not linearly dependent on the 
constant and  g Y .  The reason for this is the presence of the term 
1
g cX
J −
 in (6).  This term 
can break the reflection problem. This will happen if the  
1
g cX
J −
 term is such that it is not 
linearly dependent on a constant and  g Y ; when this is so,  g m  cannot be linearly 
dependent on the other regressors in (6).  A necessary condition for this to happen is that 
there exists at least one regressor in  i X  whose group-level average does not appear in  g Y .  
For example, identification can be achieved if an individual’s age affects educational 
outcomes, but we are willing to rule out in advance that the average age of his peers 
influences him, once we have controlled for other characteristics of the peers.  Formal 
conditions for identification in the linear model with social interactions are given in 
Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b). 
  While the reflection problem arises naturally in the linear model, it does not 
necessarily generalize to alternative data structures such as the binary choice model we 
have described.  For the binary choice model, formal statements of conditions for 
identification appear in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) for the case when the random terms 
i ε  are logistically distributed and in Brock and Durlauf (2004) for general distribution 
functions.  The logic of the reflection problem as it emerges in the linear model indicates 
  13why identification will not fail for the binary choice model.  Eq. (7) indicates that for the 
binary choice model,  g m  cannot be a linear function of the other regressors in (5).  This 
is intrinsic to the model when there is sufficient variation in  i X  and  g Y ; since 
probabilities are bounded between 0 and 1,   g m  (which is a weighted average of the 
individual-specific choice probabilities) cannot be linearly dependent on  i X  and  g Y  when 
these vectors have sufficiently wide supports.  This finding does not depend on the fact 
that the error distribution is known, see Brock and Durlauf (2005) for a proof.  Further, 
identification will generally hold for other nonlinear models, such as nonlinear 
regressions and duration data models; Brock and Durlauf (2001b) discuss these cases. 
  Of course, identification will even fail even for nonlinear models if the elements 
that comprise  i X  and  g Y  are themselves linearly dependent.  However, this source of 
nonidentification does not seem natural in most contexts.  One example where this would 
happen is a world where 1)  g g YX =  and 2) individuals are perfectly segregated by  i X  
(so that each person in a group has the same value of  i X  ).  Perfect segregation means 
that,  g i XX =  which in turn implies that  g i YX = . 
  Therefore, the two key messages for identification of social interactions with iid 
errors are 1) for linear models, identification requires that there exist individual specific 
characteristics and 2) identification will hold under standard conditions for nonlinear 
models. 
 
 
4. Social interactions and self-selection 
 
  For contexts such as residential neighborhoods, it is natural to believe that 
assumption (1), which states that individuals are randomly assigned to groups, is not 
tenable.  The natural reason for this is that in many contexts, group membership is itself a 
choice variable.  One does not think of families as being randomly allocated across 
neighborhoods; rather, families choose neighborhoods subject to constraints such as rent 
levels and personal income. For environments in which self-selection is present, the 
  14consistency of various statistical methods for estimating social interactions may be 
affected.  Specifically, the presence of self-selection can mean that the expected value of 
the random term  i ε , conditional on the individual’s characteristics and group 
memberships, may no longer be zero.  If one observes a poor family living in a rich 
neighborhood, one would reasonably infer that the level of parental investment in 
children is higher than other families.  If this investment contains an unobservable 
component, then it will be part of the  i ε  term.  Following this logic, for a model of 
educational attainment, the conditional value of  i ε  for a child who is part of a poor 
family in a rich neighborhood is positive.   
If one ignores self-selection in estimation, then one may produce spurious 
evidence of social interactions.  For example, if poorer neighborhoods tend to contain 
relatively less ambitious parents than affluent neighborhoods, and if lack of ambition on 
the part of parents leads to lower educational performance by children, then the failure to 
account for this self-selection could lead to the false conclusion that poor neighborhoods 
causally affect education.  Generally, if neighborhoods are (partially) stratified according 
to unobservable individual-level characteristics that affect outcomes, then the danger of 
finding spurious evidence of social interactions will be present. 
There is a vast literature in economics on accounting for self-selection in 
statistical exercises and it is covered in virtually any graduate microeconometrics 
textbook; see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for a recent example.  One solution to self-
selection is the use of instrumental variables. In this approach, the problem of self-
selection is interpreted as the presence of correlation between the regression errors in a 
model and the model regressors; the example of parental ambition given above produces 
such a correlation.  Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992) is a well known example of the use 
of instrumental variables to account for self-selection; this study concluded that 
controlling for self-selection eliminated the statistical significance of neighborhood 
effects for the data that were analyzed.  Of course, there is no reason why this must be the 
case; in a similar exercise, Rivkin (2001) finds estimates of social interactions increase in 
magnitude when instrumental variables are used.  One important point to note here is that 
the identification of valid instruments is often quite hard, see Heckman (1997) for 
discussion in the context of treatment effects analysis and Brock and Durlauf (2001c) for 
  15discussion using aggregate data to study economic growth.  Intuitively, one often finds 
that asserted instruments, while predetermined with respect to a behavioral equation, 
nevertheless are likely to violate the requirement of uncorrelatedness with the equation 
error, once one considers a complete description of the behavioral decisions of the agents 
under study.     
Within econometrics, the deepest analyses of self-selection are based on explicitly 
modeli
 
ng the self-selection and including it as part of the statistical analysis.  Unlike the 
instrumental variables approach, this has interesting implications for identification, at 
least for the linear model; Brock and Durlauf (2001b), first recognized this possibility.  
To understand their argument, rewrite the regression error in the linear model as 
 
( ) ,, ii gg i i g Xg cX dY Jm E X Y F i ω εξ =+++ + . (12) 
 
his expression exploits Heckman’s (1979) idea that in the presence of self-selection, the  T
regression residual  i ε  no longer has a conditional mean of zero.  Following the logic 
behind Heckman’s classic selection correction, eq. (12) can be consistently estimated if 
one adds a term proportional to  ( ) | ,, ii gX g EX Y F ε  to (12) prior to estimation; denote this 
estimate as  ()
n
| ,, gX g Y F κε  .  Heckman’s great insight was that one can construct 
 th
 
ii EX
such a term.  Hence, from is perspective, controlling for self-selection amounts to 
estimating   
 
( )
n
| ,, ii gg i i g X g cX dY Jm E X Y F i ω ρκ ε ξ =+++ + . (13) 
 
hus, accounting for self-selection necessitates considering identification for this 
for the identification of social interactions is that the term 
T
regression, as opposed to (2).   
  The property of interest 
()
n
| ii gX g E κε ,, X Y F can help facilitate identification.  To see this, consider two 
  16possibilities for the underlying conditional expectation  ( ) | ,, ii gX g EX Y F ε . One possibility 
is that 
 
  ( ) ( ) | ,, ii gX g g EX Y F m ε =φ  (14) 
 
In this case, the presence of the regressor  ( )
n
| ,, ii gX g EX Y F κε  in (13) means that the 
model is no longer linear in  g m . Assuming  ( ) φ ⋅  is invertible, then the self-consistent 
solution for  g m  is 
 
  ( ) ( ) g g mk c d Y ψ =+ +  (15) 
 
where  () ψ ⋅  is the inverse of  ( ) 1 φ −⋅ .  Eq. (15) illustrates that for this case, self-selection 
converts a linear model that is not identified into a nonlinear (in  g m ) model in which 
g m cannot be linearly dependent on a constant term and  g Y .  The key point is that self-
selection induces an intrinsic nonlinearity into the determinants of individual behavior 
and so converts the linear model into a nonlinear one. 
  Alternatively, suppose that  
 
  ( ) ( ) | ,, , ii gX g i g EX Y F X Y εφ =  (16) 
 
In this case,  ( , ig ) X Y φ  functions as an additional individual-specific regressor whose 
group level average does not appear in (13).  Hence, following the argument about 
identification in linear models that was developed in the previous section, the presence of 
the regressor with a nonzero coefficient can allow for identification to occur.  This 
  17approach to identification has been successfully used in Ioannides and Zabel (2003b) to 
identify social interaction effects in housing.
8
The incorporation of self-selection into social epidemiology analyses seems, from 
the vantage point of econometrics, of first order significance.  Self-selection issues have 
proven to be of enormous importance in understanding a range of issues involving 
questions of policy evaluation.  A major component of James Heckman’s profound 
contributions to economics revolves around developing ways to draw inferences when 
self-selection is present.  See Heckman (2001) for an extraordinary survey.  
In accounting for self-selection, it is important to recognize that self-selection can 
occur with respect to unobservable variables.  In the context of job training programs, for 
example, program participation and completion is likely to be associated with the abilities 
and ambitions of an individual.  This contrasts with the sort of analysis that is associated 
with causal inference in which selection is assumed to occur with respect to observables. 
The latter does not necessarily affect inferences; for example in the linear model selection 
on observables does not affect analysis of the linear model (2) so long as 
( | ,, 0 ii gX g EX Y F ε = )
                                                
.  Much of the statistical literature on causal effects focuses on self-
selection on observables, as Heckman (1996) makes clear, such an approach is often 
inadequate as it is typical that “persons making decisions have more information about 
the outcomes than the statisticians studying them” (p. 461).  This is clearly the case for 
group memberships. 
It appears that there has been some confusion in the social epidemiology literature 
on the implications for self-selection in empirical analysis when selection occurs on 
unobservables.  Subramanian (2004), in criticizing arguments of Oakes (2004) who 
 
8 An important unanswered research question is how one can employ semiparametric 
estimates of  (
n
| ,, ii gX g EX Y F κε )  to help identify social interactions models; existing 
theoretical results on identification (Brock and Durlauf (2001b,2004), Ioannides and 
Zabel (2003b)) construct estimates based on parameter assumptions about the distribution 
of the error  i ε  in (2) as well as the selection question that is combined with (2) to 
produce the estimated  ()
n
| ,, ii gX g EX Y F κε . 
 
  18argues that self-selection invalidates many claims in the social epidemiology literature, 
suggests that self-selection issues “are partially tractable and one potential strategy is 
through applying creative multilevel structures” (p. 1963).  His example seems to suggest 
that movements across neighborhoods can provide information on the presence of social 
interactions.  Such a claim is untenable unless one models the decision to change 
neighborhoods.  The value of the self-selection correction   ( ) | ,, ii gX g EX Y F ε  will depend 
on the characteristics of a neighborhood and so will differ for a given individual when he 
is observed in different neighborhoods.  Perhaps this is reading too much into the 
discussion in Subramanian (2004).  However, what is known from the econometrics 
literature is that one cannot make arguments about what is or is not identified without 
formal analysis; terms such as “partially tractable” are only meaningful in the context of a 
fully articulated model. 
We also disagree with Oakes (2004) to the extent that he advocates randomized 
experiments as clearly superior to other data sets in uncovering social interactions.  His 
argument that such data sets can overcome self-selection problems is of course correct.  
However, as illustrated in the discussion of eqs. (12)-(16), self-selection can, when 
correctly modeled, facilitate identification.  This should not be surprising.  Self-selection 
describes another behavior by individuals beyond the behavioral choice  i ω -the choice of 
group membership.  This second choice has implicit information about the social 
interactions the group produces.  While exploration of how this additional information 
may be exploited has only just begun, it seems potentially important. 
 
   
5. Unobserved group effects 
 
  The second major deviation from the baseline social interactions model concerns 
the possibility that unobserved group effects exist.  This case has received attention in the 
linear case in Brock and Durlauf (2001b), Graham and Hahn (2004) and Graham (2005) 
and in the binary choice case in Brock and Durlauf (2005). To be concrete, if one is 
interested in whether residential neighborhoods produce social interactions that affect 
  19offspring educational performance, a natural candidate for an unobservable is the average 
quality of schools, at least some component of which is unobservable to the 
econometrician.   
Similar to the case of self-selection, the presence of the unobservable group 
effects can, if not accounted for, lead to spurious conclusions concerning the presence of 
social interactions.  Why? Suppose that more affluent parents choose neighborhoods with 
higher school quality. If one then calculates the correlation between student outcomes 
and average neighborhood income, this correlation will be positive not because of any 
influence of the incomes of others on a given student, but because average parental 
income is itself correlated with school quality.  Notice one would not necessarily regard 
these effects as unobserved types of social interactions.  For example, variations in school 
quality may derive from variation in the quality of teachers, which is driven by 
community attributes such as the opportunities for spousal employment that have nothing 
to do with social influences on children.     
Algebraically, the introduction of unobserved group effects is simple. Denoting 
the fixed effect as  g α , the original linear model is modified to 
   
  ii g g g kc X d Y J m i ω αξ = +++ + + . (17) 
 
In parallel, the payoff comparison in the original binary choice model is modified to 
 
  () ( ) , 11
e
ii i g i g g VV k c X d Y J m i α ε −− = + + + +− . (18) 
 
So that the conditional probability that 1 is chosen is modified from (3) to  
 
  () ( ) , Pr 1 , ,
e
ii g g i g i g XY Fk c X d Y J m ε g ω α == + + + α +  (19) 
 
with the new self-consistency condition 
 
  20  ( ) 21 gg g g Xg mF k c X d Y J m d F ε α =+ + + + ∫ . −  (20) 
 
Unobserved group effects are usually best regarded as fixed effects, since there is 
typically no plausible reason to believe the effects are orthogonal to observable group 
characteristics. In contrast, suppose that group memberships are generated endogenously 
and individuals observe  g α  when groups are formed. If so, then there will presumably be 
some relation between  g α  and those characteristics of individuals and the associated 
groups that are observed by the econometrician.  Returning to our neighborhoods and 
education example, since families will presumably care about teacher quality when 
selecting neighborhoods this will induce correlations between unobserved (to the 
econometrician) school quality and variables such as average income of parents.  In our 
view, the problem of unobserved group characteristics is the most serious impediment to 
developing persuasive evidence of social interactions.   
For linear models, identification in cross-sections is impossible when fixed effects 
are present.  Any pattern of outcomes in the linear model without unobserved fixed 
effects can be replicated one for one by an identical model with no social interactions and 
unobserved group effects. One simply sets  g g dY Jmg α = + .  Identification of social 
interactions in linear models with unobserved group effects can occur for alternative data 
structures and models.   
One way to achieve identification with unobserved fixed effects involves using 
panel data.  In this approach, the assumption is that the unobservable group effects are 
time invariant whereas other determinants of behavior are not.  The basic idea in the 
panel approach is to consider a time indexed analog to (17), i.e.  
 
  ,, , , it it gt gt g it kc X d Y J m , ω αξ =+ + + + +  (21) 
 
and construct differences of the form 
 
  () ( ) ( ) ,, 1 , , 1 ,, 1 , , 1, , it it it it gt gt gt gt it it cX X dY Y Jm m 1 ω ωξ −−− − −= − + − + − + − ξ −  (22) 
 
  21As (22) illustrates, taking first differences of  , it ω  can eliminate the unobserved fixed 
effect  g α .  This approach is employed, for example, in Hoxby (2000a,b).  The validity of 
this approach, of course, depends on the validity of the assumption that  g α does not vary 
over time.  For this reason, differencing generally cannot be used to account for self-
selection in panels; the time-indexed version of the self-selection correction analyzed in 
Section 4 will normally vary across time as it is a function of   and  , it X , g t Y .  
   Alternatively, one can follow Graham (2005) and assume that  g α  is a random 
effect rather than a fixed effect. Of course, to do this, one needs to be able to defend the 
random effect assumption; for Graham the assumption is tenable because the data he 
studies involves random assignments of students to classrooms.  This approach also 
necessitates restricting the analysis to the effort to identify some social interactions, i.e. 
conducting the analysis without distinguishing between endogenous and contextual 
effects.  A variant of Graham’s approach, which corresponds to the framework we have 
been using, is the following.
9  Consider the regression 
 
  ig g kd Y i ω αε = ++ + , (23) 
 
we assume that  g Y  is a scalar for convenience.  If there are no social interactions present, 
i.e.  , then   0 d =
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) var var var iig ω ε =+ α
Note that the random effect assumption means that 
 (24) 
 
( ) cov , 0 gg Y α = .  In contrast, if social 
interactions are present, then 
                                                 
9Graham (2005) considers the model  ig g i kJ ω ωαε = ++ +  and exploits data from an 
experiment in which students were assigned to classrooms of different sizes, leading to 
differences in the variance of  g ω which is partially determined, of course, by the number 
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  () ( ) ( ) ( ) var var var var ii gg dY ω εα =+ + . (25) 
 
Now suppose that groups come in two types: those such that  g Y  is drawn from a 
distribution with variance h   and those such that   g Y  is drawn from a distribution with 
variance h; by assumption hh > , one can construct an estimate of the social interactions 
parameter d.   
 
() ( ) ( )
() ()
2 var var var var
var var var var
ig ig
ig ig
Yh Yhd h h
Yh Yh
d
hh
ωω
ωω
= −= = −
=− =
=
−
 
⇒
 (26) 
 
The idea of using variance differences to identify social interactions is also employed in 
this analysis focuses on what may be  Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996); 
learned about social interactions from aggregated data. 
  In using tests of this type, it is important that a researcher is able to justify the 
assumption that the distribution of  g α  does not vary across groups.  It is not clear that 
bs
 
ocial interactions for cross-
this is so, even if group memberships are randomly assigned. For example, in Graham’s 
analysis, in which students are o erved in classrooms with different numbers of 
classmates, the assumption implicitly means that the variance of teacher quality does not 
depend on the number students who are being taught. 
  In moving from linear models to binary choice models, some new results emerge. 
For binary choice models, one can develop evidence of s
section data even in the presence of group-level fixed effects.  Panel methods can help 
with identification as well; these are discussed in Brock and Durlauf (2005).  Unlike the 
linear model case, Brock and Durlauf (2005) show that it is also possible to learn 
something about social interactions from cross-section data.  
                                                                                                                                                 
of members of g . Computation of the value of J is more elaborate than the calculation of 
  23The reason why cross-section data on binary choices may produce evidence in 
support or against social interactions is that the binary choice model can produce multiple 
equilibria only if endogenous social interaction effects are present.  If the available data 
require the existence of multiple equilibria, this in turn implies the existence of 
endogenous social interactions.  To develop this argument, we assume that there is 
random assignment of individuals across groups 
 
  X Xg FF = . (27) 
 
Brock and Durlauf (2005) consider various relaxations of this assumption, but the bulk of 
the analysis in that paper is conducted under (27), as may be seen when one examines the 
formal proofs underlying the subsequent discussion. 
The translation of multiple equilibria into data restrictions is somewhat 
complicated.  A major intuition as to why multiple equilibria are associated with 
endogenous social interactions is that the multiple equilibria can produce what Brock and 
Durlauf refer to as pattern reversals.  Assume that d o that increasing any element in  0 >  s
g Y   creases, other things equal, the probability that an individual in g chooses 1. One 
can always measure the elements of 
in
g Y  this way, so long as one knows the direction of 
the effects of its elements.  A pattern reversal occurs for groups   and   if  g g′
 
   and  g gg YY mm g ′ ′ < > . (28) 
 
Recall that  g m  can be computed, since it is the conditional expectation of the same 
average of within-group choices  g ω , so pattern reversals represent restrictions on data.  
For the identification of social interactions, pattern reversals are important because they 
may derive from the presence of endogenous social interactions producing multiple 
equilibria.  Why?  Intuitively, multiple equilibria can produce a pattern reversal because 
                                                                                                                                                 
d which we illustrate, but the idea is the same.   
  24group g can coordinate on a high  g m  equilibrium whereas group  g′ does not so that the 
ect of the higher value of Y on the average outcome in the group is negated. 
The difficulty with using this heuristic argument is that without any re rictions on 
eff
st
g α , pattern reversals can occur without multiple equilibria being present. Brock and 
Durlauf (2005) thus attempt to identify weak restrictions associated with  g α  such that 
pattern reversals imply the existence of multiple equilibria and hence endogenous social 
interactions.  This type of argument does not identify the value of the endogenous social 
interactions parameter J, rather it shows that the value is nonzero and large enough to 
produc
entific
on the group level unobserva
e multiple equilibria.  As such, it is a form of partial identification, cf. Manski 
(2003).  
What sorts of assumptions allow for partial id ation of J via pattern 
reversals?  One potentially appealing assumption is a stochastic monotonicity restriction 
bles.  Suppose that if  g g YY ′ > , then the conditional 
g′, distribution of unobservables in 
g g Y α F
′ ′ , is first order stochastically dominated by 
g g Y F
α . In this case, subject to various technical conditions described in Brock and Durlauf 
(2005),
om
 the pattern reversal defined by (28) will imply that endogenous social interactions 
exist. 
Another route towards partial identification of social interactions is via 
unimodality versus multimodality c parisons.   Suppose that  g Y  is constant across 
groups,  i X  is constant across all individuals within and across groups and that  0 g α = .  
In this case, it is easy to see that  g m  will take on a single v when there are no 
teractions and will take on one of a finite set of values when there 
are multiple equilibria due to social interactions.  Suppose that 
alue 
endogenous social in
g g Y dF
α is unimodal for all 
g Y . In this case,  g m  will be multimodal, with each equilibrium representing
ue. T
 a possible 
val his leads to the intuition that multiple equilibria may occur when one relaxes the 
assumption that  g Y  and  i X  are constant.  
The translation of this intuition into data restrictions turns out to be fairly hard.  
  25One reason for   straightforward: if  this is g α  exhibits multimodality, then there is no link 
between multiple equilibria and unimo lity of the other variables.  Hence it is necessary 
to assume that 
da
g g Y dF
α is unimodal for all  g Y . However, even in this case, it turns out that 
multimodality of  g m  conditional on  g Y  is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for the existence of multiple equilibria.  The reason for this is that the relationship 
n  betwee g m  and  g Y  is nonlinear as indicated by eq. (20),  and this nonlinearity can 
induce multimodality.  Brock and Durlauf (2005) overcome this problem by considering 
g g Ym dF  ra  than ther  
g g mY dF .  Specific  show that unimodality of ally, they  
g g Y α
that there must exist a vector 
dF implies 
π  such that  
g g Ym dF
π is unimodal if there are no endogenous 
social interactions.   T is h  is the correct way to think about pattern reversals and 
ultim m odality.  When social interactions are present, a given  g m  may be associated with 
more than one value of  g Y . 
  In our judgment, the identification of social interactions effects in the presence of 
unobserved group effects represents the major existing impediment to developing 
evidence of the role of social influences.  The reason for this is that in the contexts in 
which social interactions are usually studied, there are typically many unobserved group 
characteristics that can be argued to plausibly affect individual outcomes.  One example 
was given for the relationship between educational outcomes and neighborhoods.  For 
another example, the ability to infer a relationship between social factors and crime rates 
requires careful attention to the possibility of differential police resources across 
eighborhoods.  Further work on identification for the case of unobserved group effects is 
us of great importance. 
In this section, we relate some of our analysis to the treatment of social 
n
th
 
 
6. Some implications for social epidemiology 
 
 
interactions in the social epidemiology literature. 
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i. the reflection problem and endogenous social interactions 
 
  As far as we know, with the exception of Oakes (2004) there has been no 
attention to the reflection problem in the social epidemiology literature.  The reason for 
this appears to derive from differences between the economic and epidemiological 
concepts of individual outcomes.  In the economics contexts, choices are purposeful and 
so it is natural to attempt to identify direct interdependences in decisions, whether they 
are due to a primitive psychological preference for conformity or information 
transmission that occurs via the behaviors of others.  In contexts such as health outcomes, 
e.g. coronary heart disease, such factors do not directly occur.  That being said, it does 
appear that consideration of endogenous social interactions would augment 
epidemiological studies.  In the context of health outcomes, endogenous social 
teract
nswer is no.  Suppose that one is 
terested in changing the value of an element in
in ions can affect behaviors that in turn affect health. So, to the extent that exercise 
levels are influenced by social interactions, if exercise affects health, one has an 
endogenous influence. 
  Does the explicit evaluation of endogenous versus contextual effects matter?  If 
one is interested in understanding causal mechanisms, the answer is clearly yes.   
However, there are certain dimensions along which the a
  i X in  for each of the members of a group.  
The eff  this in the linear model is fully characterized by th
individual behavior, i.e. the combination of (2) with (6) 
ect of e reduced form for 
 
 
11 1
ii g g i
kd J c
cX Y X
JJ J
ω ε =+ + + +
−− −
 (29) 
 
The regression is known in the econometrics literature as a reduced form as it relates  i ω  
to a set of predetermined variables.  The coefficients in this regression are, as analyzed in 
Manski (1993), all identified under standard linear independence conditions on the 
regressors  i X  and  g Y , even if one cannot identify the distinct roles of contextual and 
endogenous effects.  So, if all one wants to do is generate predictions of the effect of a 
  27change in some predetermined variable (i.e. an element of  i X  or  g Y ) on an individual
10, 
this regression is sufficient.  For example, if one is interested in the effects on student 
outcomes from redistricting schools, and if school district define the groups through 
which social interactions occur, then the effects of the policy change on students may be 
determined without distinguishing between the respective roles of contextual effects and 
endogenous effects; the effects can be determined via (29); the reduced form is thus 
sufficient for prediction of policy effects.   
In contrast, the distinction between contextual effects and endogenous effects 
must be accounted for in order to understand the implications of changing elements of i X  
and/or  g Y .  In the binary choice model, if one omits the endogenous effect in estimating 
(5), then the estimates of the remaining parameters will not be consistent and cannot be 
interpreted as a reduced form.  If one considers the effects of redistricting on binary 
choices such as graduation, one potentially important effect may derive through the effect 
of the redistricting on the number of equilibria. 
 
ii. hierarchical models 
 
Unlike economics, social interactions are generally modeled in the social 
epidemiology literature using hierarchical models, i.e. models in which contextual effects 
alter the coefficients that link individual characteristics to outcomes.  The reason for this 
again appears to be a different conceptualization of the meaning of social interactions in 
economics in comparison to other social sciences.  Hierarchical models appear, in our 
reading, to be motivated by a view of social groups as defining ecologies in which 
decisions are made and matter because different ecologies induce different mappings 
from the individual determinants of these behaviors and choices, cf. Raudenbush and 
Sampson (1999).  Economics, in contrast, regards the elements that comprise endogenous 
and contextual social interactions as directly affecting the preferences, constraints, and 
beliefs of agents and so treats them as additional determinants to individual specific 
                                                 
10By predetermined variables, we refer to variables that are determined at the time the 
choices  i ω  are made. 
  28characteristics,  i X .  The specific modeling choices in terms of either allowing for 
coefficients to linearly depend on group characteristics as occurs in hierarchical models, 
or the direct embedding of group characteristics in decision rules as suggested by the role 
they are hypothesized to play, as occurs in economics, follow from these different 
conceptions of why group memberships matter.   
For hierarchical models, there has been little attention to identification problems 
of the sort that have been analyzed in the social interactions literature, although these 
arguments are clearly germane.  This subsection explores identification of hierarchical 
models.  One formulation that seems consistent with the logic of hierarchical models is 
 
  ii i ii g kc XJ m i ω ε = ++ +  (30) 
 
where self-consistency of beliefs has been imposed, and  
 
  , ,  ig i g c i kk d Y cc Y JJ Y J g π ′ =+ =+Π =+ . (31) 
 
In (31),   is a matrix.  We omit any random terms in (31) for simplicity.  This 
formulation assumes that the endogenous effect directly affects outcomes whereas the 
contextual effect works via the individual behavioral coefficients.  This model can easily 
be translated into the original linear framework we have analyzed.  The hierarchical 
model described by (30) and (31) is thus equivalent to the linear model 
c Π
 
  ,
e
ii g i g g c i J g i g kc X d Y J m Y X Y m ,
e
i ω π ′ =+ + + +Π + + ε . (32) 
 
Hence, the difference between the linear model used in economics and the hierarchical 
structure is the addition of the terms  g ci YX ′Π  and  ,
e
g ig Ym .   
Can this model exhibit the reflection problem?  The self-consistent solution to eq. 
(32) is  
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1
g gg c g
g
Jg
kc X d Y Y X
m
JY π
′ + ++ Π
=
−−
 (33) 
 
where, as before, g X is the within group average of  i X .  The reflection problem originally 
emerged when the  g Y  vector equalled the within-group averages of  i X .  If we impose 
this, then (33) becomes 
 
 
1
g gg c g
g
Jg
kc X d Y Y Y
m
JY π
′ + ++ Π
=
−−
. (34) 
 
Eq. (34) makes clear that the relationship between  g m  and the other regressors is 
nonlinear; further, the presence of  g cg YY ′Π  in the numerator and  J g Y π −  in the 
denominator ensures that linear dependence will not hold, except for hairline cases, so 
long as there is sufficient variation in  i X  and  g Y .  In other words, the hierarchical model 
will be identified under standard conditions on  i X  and  g Y . 
  This hierarchical model with contextual and endogenous social interactions will 
not exhibit multiple equilibria even though the model contains nonlinearities.  However, 
the nonlinear structure of the model distinguishes it from the linear model in that the 
reflection problem can be overcome without prior information about the relationship 
between  g X  and  g Y .  And equally important, because hierarchical models are nonlinear, 
this means that the failure to account for the possibility of endogenous effects will lead to 
inconsistent estimates so that the misspecified model cannot be used to evaluate the 
effects of changes in different variables, or the effects on individual outcomes of altering 
group memberships, e.g. by changing school district boundaries.   
This is apparent from eq. (34).  The equilibrium effect of a change in  g Y  on  g m is 
nonlinear when endogenous effects are present, i.e. when the vector  J π  is nonzero.  This 
means that the effect of a change in contextual effects on the expected average behavior 
of the system will differ according to the initial value of  g Y .  If the system defined by eqs. 
  30(30) and (31) is estimated under the assumption that  0 J π = , then the resultant estimates 
will not provide a model in which counterfactuals may be accurately evaluated.   
Predictions based on the erroneous assumption of no endogenous effects can be highly 
misleading, although the extent to which this is true will depend on context. 
  
iii. social capital 
 
  A large number of social epidemiology papers study the role of social capital in 
determining various health related outcomes.  These studies often use aggregated data at 
levels ranging from residential neighborhoods to larger units; see Lochner et al (2003) 
and Kawachi et al (1997) for examples in which social capital is used to understand 
mortality.  In this approach, average group outcomes are regressed against various group 
level controls and a measure of social capital.  The general social capital literature has 
been subjected to criticism due to the lack of conceptual precision in defining, let alone 
measuring, social capital (see Durlauf (2002a,b) and Portes (1998,2000)), but our purpose 
here is to evaluate identification. 
  To do this, we consider the case where social capital is endogenous.  What this 
means is that each individual chooses a level of social capital   in addition to the 
outcome of interest 
i SC
i ω .  Notice that even for outcomes such as mortality, which are not 
themselves choice variables, behaviors that contribute to the outcome such as exercise, 
diet, and willingness to take risks, are endogenous, so the identification analysis we have 
employed seems relevant.  Further, the notion that social capital is endogenous does not 
necessarily imply that the individual choices that produce social capital are conscious 
ones.  One may adopt a level of personal honesty in dealing with others based on norms 
of honesty in a community without being consciously aware that one has done so.  
Our discussion will focus only on the linear model, in order to use results in 
Durlauf (2002a).  The introduction of social capital thus leads to a two equation linear 
model that generalizes (2) 
 
  12 ii g g g kc X d Y J m J s i ω ε =+ + + + + (35) 
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and    
  12. ii g g g SC k cX dY J m J s i η =+ + + + +  (36) 
 
These two equations describe the joint determination of the outcome of interest and social 
capital.  In these equations,   denotes the level of social capital associated with 
individual i and 
i SC
g s  denotes the expected average level of social capital in his group.  The 
terms k , c ,d , 1 J , are  2 J  are all coefficients in the social capital equation; regressors in 
the two equations are assumed to be the same.  As before, we employ expected rather 
than realized levels for aggregate outcome variables for simplicity.  
  Durlauf (2002a) provides conditions for identification of this model.  The main 
findings are that this joint social interactions/social capital model suffers from an 
analogous reflection problem to the original social interactions model.  Identification 
requires prior information to restrict the presence of particular terms in the equations.  In 
particular, to identify the parameters of (35) it is necessary that there exist two elements 
of  i X  whose group level analogs are not elements of  g Y .   
In many contexts in which social capital is analyzed, individual level data are not 
available.  If one only has group level data available, then the equations that may be 
studied are parallel to the individual model, i.e. 
 
  12 g gg g kd Y J m J s g ω ε = ++ + +  (37) 
 
where  g ω  is the sample average within group g of  i ω  and 
 
  12 g gg g SC k dY J m J s g η = ++ + + . (38) 
 
In order to identify the social capital effect, i.e. the coefficient   , with aggregate data, it 
is necessary to distinguish it from the contextual effects 
2 J
g Y  as well as the endogenous 
  32effect  g m .  Formal conditions for identification are given in Durlauf (2002a).  One 
requirement for identification is that one must be able to identify two elements of  g Y  that 
appear in the social interaction equation (38) but do not appear in the outcome equation 
(37); i.e. the coefficients in (37) are a priori known to equal 0.  Unless these two elements 
exist, SC cannot be linearly independent of both  g Y  and  g m .  
Durlauf (2002a) argues that such prior information is generally implausible.  One 
reason for this relates to the definitional ambiguities for social capital.  Without a clear 
definition, it is hard to see how one can argue that an aggregate variable affects its 
aggregate level without directly affecting the aggregate outcome  g ω .  If one is willing to 
assume that  , then one still needs at least one element of  1 0 J = g Y  to affect social capital 
without affecting the aggregate outcome, which again requires justification.  We are not 
aware of any empirical application where this defense is actually made.  
This discussion illustrates some reasons why empirical claims on the role of social 
capital in influencing individuals and especially for groups are, in our judgment, often 
very weak.  Empirical studies of social capital rely on implicit assumptions about which 
variables influence individuals and groups that are not stated and, in our view, can be 
highly unappealing.  This negative conclusion should not be interpreted as a dismissal of 
the social capital concept; weaknesses in current empirical practice in no way imply 
social capital is uninteresting or unimportant.  Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) discuss 
routes by which social capital inferences may be strengthened. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
  While the econometrics literature on social interactions is still quite new, progress 
has been made in understanding important aspects of identification.  Much remains to be 
done, in particular with respect to comprehensive studies of dynamic versus cross-section 
environments. Still, considerable progress has been made in understanding when social 
interactions can or cannot be identified in various data sets.     
  33In conclusion, we note that terms such as “propensity score” and “causality” did 
not earlier appear anywhere in this essay.  This omission is not inadvertent. From the 
perspective of the social interactions, the causality research program pioneered in the 
statistics literature has had little impact.  The reason for this is that social interactions 
models in economics have been conceptualized as fully articulated descriptions on 
individual behavior, as opposed to efforts to identify the effects of changing certain 
factors, as occurs in the analysis of treatment effects; as such, social interactions 
econometrics reflects standard economic reasoning.  From the social interactions 
perspective, one does not naturally think of a group as a treatment, but rather as a 
constrained choice by the individual.  When one worries about selection on 
unobservables, one moves away from the sorts of assumptions such as strong ignorability 
that are important in the causality literature.  Perhaps the most important message of this 
chapter is that there are perspectives on the inference of social interactions that are not 
well captured from the perspective of purely statistical literatures and may be addressed 
only by careful consideration of the behavioral foundations that underlie a statistical 
model specification. 
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